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Learning from the Ǯlifeworldǯ 
 
Introduction 
Joanna Brooks (Senior Research Fellow, University of Huddersfield) The term Ǯphenomenologyǯ is generally well-known amongst qualitative psychologists but is 
perhaps not so well recognised or understood by those less involved in qualitative research.  
Additionally, phenomenology has developed and diversified to encompass a potentially 
bewildering array of different traditions and methods.  In this article, we will provide a basic 
introduction to phenomenology, with a whistle-stop tour of its history, key figures and 
applications in psychology.  We will then turn to leading qualitative psychologists who identify 
themselves as taking a phenomenological stance, as they explain the particular ways in which 
they understand and draw upon the principles of phenomenology and apply these in their own 
work.  We suggest that phenomenological psychology may be thought of as an umbrella term 
encompassing a variety of rich and useful approaches rather than a single position and we hope 
that in this article we are able to showcase just some of the ways in which a phenomenological 
stance is being utilised by qualitative psychologists in the UK today. 
 
Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) is generally credited as the founding father of phenomenology.  
Although different branches of phenomenology with their own particular variations and 
emphases have subsequently developed, all are usually acknowledged as stemming from (usserlǯs original work.  (usserl was concerned with developing phenomenology as a rigorous 
alternative to methods traditionally used by the natural sciences.  These existing methods were, 
Husserl believed, inappropriate for the examination of human experience.  In contrast to 
notions of an objective reality, Husserl suggests that it is in fact only our experience of the world – that is, direct and subjective human experience - which is Ǯknowableǯ.  We can, (usserl argues, 
only really know and understand concepts when they are grounded in concrete experience.   
 
A fundamental concept is the lifeworld, the world of lived experience inhabited by us as 
conscious beings, and incorporating the way in which phenomena (events, objects, emotions) 
appear to us in our conscious experience or everyday life.  Husserl conceptualised the lifeworld 
as pre-reflective – that is, our focus is on what we are perceiving rather than how we are perceiving it.  (usserlǯs project was to isolate essences – invariant features and structures of 
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phenomena – and to describe these as precisely as possible.  By isolating such essences from a 
range of experiences, Husserl argued that it might be possible to identify the qualities giving a 
specific experiential phenomenon its distinctiveness.  Husserl believed that to do this, it was 
also necessary to adopt a specific attitude, to suspend – or ǲbracketǳ - presuppositions and 
judgements so that a clear and unblinkered view of the lifeworld could emerge.  This attitude is 
known as the epoché.  
 
How far it is possible to fully engage with and transcend the epoché is a topic of contention for 
different phenomenological traditions - and it was in fact a pupil of (usserlǯs, Martin (eidegger 
(1889-ͳͻ͹͸Ȍ, who first developed an alternative to (usserlǯs original descriptive or 
transcendental phenomenology.  Heidegger is associated with the development of existential or 
hermeneutic phenomenology.  For Heidegger, we are, as human beings, inseparable from the 
world in which we live and exist –we exist in the world, rather than next to or outside of it.  If 
this is the case, then notions of achieving the epoché as advocated by Husserl become more 
problematic.  Rather than focusing on how we know what we know, Heidegger was instead 
interested in exploring what it means to live in and among a world which is experienced by each 
individual in their own way.  Heiddeger saw our relation to the world as being always both 
interpretive and relational – we are always situated in context.  This means that to understand 
reality, we need to understand both detailed experience and the bigger picture, and thus factors 
such as language, temporality, history and culture become important.  Neither the whole nor the 
individual elements can be really understood without reference to the other – this is known as 
the hermeneutic circle. The extent to which the bracketing of presuppositions is possible, and 
the appropriate balance between description and interpretation in phenomenologically 
informed work continue to provoke considerable debate to this day.   
 (eideggerǯs writings inspired many other theorists and writers and for phenomenological 
psychologists, the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is often highlighted as 
particularly influential.  Merleau-Ponty radically challenged accepted dualist notions prevalent 
at the time, arguing that as people are embodied beings, we cannot, when considering human 
experience, meaningfully detach mind from body, nor subject from object (ǮThere is no inner 
man, man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himselfǯ – Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/1962).  Much of Merleau-Pontyǯs work originates from empirical psychology studies (he 
held a Chair in Child Psychology and Pedagogy at the University of Sorbonne in Paris and was 
succeeded to this post by Jean Piaget) and the productive amalgamation of phenomenology and 
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psychology continues today. Phenomenology has been an important source of reference for the 
development of qualitative psychology as it provides a philosophical rationale for focusing on 
the study of human experience.  However, as we alluded to earlier, there are a considerable 
array of different traditions and methods encompassed under the umbrella term of 
phenomenology.  We turn now to a number of leading qualitative UK psychologists to reflect on 
some of the thought-provoking ways they personally draw upon phenomenological principles 
and approaches in their work.  In alphabetical order:  Peter Ashworth reflects on how his use of 
a descriptive lifeworld approach to phenomenological psychology can reveal Ǯtaken-for-grantedǯ 
meanings in everyday life experience, using the example of gift giving; Darren Langdridge uses 
an example from his research on sexualities to describe how his Critical Narrative Approach 
with its explicit focus on narrative works with language, power and politics within an 
phenomenological framework; Rosie Morrow, Alison Rodriguez and Nigel King outline Colaizziǯs 
(1978) descriptive approach to phenomenology – little known in psychology but widely used in 
other fields – using an example from a study on the experience of camping; and Jonathan Smith 
uses two examples from his recent research into depression and chronic pain to demonstrate 
how his approach to experiential research (Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis or IPA) 
draws on a range of phenomenological thinking to capture lived experience whilst recognising 
research as a dynamic and necessarily interpretative process.  We would hasten to add that 
these provide a glimpse of just some of the wide variety of approaches available, but we hope 
that these concise exemplars give some idea of the array of approaches to phenomenology being 
used in psychology today. 
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Colaizziǯs descriptive phenomenological method 
Rosie Morrow (Postgraduate Student, University of Huddersfield) Alison Rodriguez (Senior 
Lecturer, University of Huddersfield) and Nigel King (Professor, University of Huddersfield)  
 Descriptive phenomenology is concerned with revealing the ǲessenceǳ or ǲessential structureǳ of 
any phenomenon under investigation – that is, those features that make it what it is, rather than 
something else. By far the best known descriptive approach in psychology is that of Amedeo 
Giorgi (1985), who is widely credited as a pioneer in bringing phenomenological thinking into psychology. Giorgiǯs method can be seen as a form of distillation, in which the analyst step by 
step sifts away everything that is not essential to an adequate description of the phenomenon. It 
is, however, not the only descriptive phenomenological method in the social and human 
sciences. We focus here on a method proposed by Colaizzi (1978), which is little-known in 
psychology but widely used in other disciplines such as the health sciences. We argue that the 
method has considerable potential for qualitative psychologists, especially those coming fresh 
to descriptive phenomenology. 
 Colaizziǯs ȋͳͻ͹ͺȌ distinctive seven step process provides a rigorous analysis, with each step 
staying close to the data . The end result is a concise yet all-encompassing description of the 
phenomenon under study, validated by the participants that created it. The method depends 
upon rich first-person accounts of experience; these may come from face-to-face interviews, but 
can also be obtained in multiple other ways; written narratives, blogs, research diaries, online 
interviews and so on. The stages are illustrated in the table below: 
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Table 1. Steps in Colaizziǯs descriptive phenomenological method 
Step  Description 
1. Familiarisation The researcher familiarises him or herself with the data, 
by reading through all the participant accounts several 
times 
2. Identifying 
significant statements 
The researcher identifies all statements in the accounts 
that are of direct relevance to the phenomenon under 
investigation 
3. Formulating 
meanings 
The researcher identifies meanings relevant to the 
phenomenon that arise from a careful consideration of 
the significant statements. The researcher must reflexively ǲbracketǳ his or her pre-suppositions to stick 
closely to the phenomenon as experienced (though 
Colaizzi recognises that complete bracketing is never 
possible). 
4. Clustering themes The researcher clusters the identified meanings into 
themes that are common across all accounts. Again 
bracketing of pre-suppositions is crucial, especially to 
avoid any potential influence of existing theory. 
5. Developing an 
exhaustive 
description 
The researcher writes a full and inclusive description of 
the phenomenon, incorporating all the themes produced 
at step 4. 
6. Producing the 
fundamental 
structure 
The researcher condenses the exhaustive description 
down to a short, dense statement that captures just 
those aspects deemed to be essential to the structure of 
the phenomenon. 
7. Seeking verification 
of the fundamental 
structure 
The researcher returns the fundamental structure 
statement to all participants (or sometimes a sub-
sample in larger studies) to ask whether it captures 
their experience. He or she may go back and modify 
earlier steps in the analysis in the light of this feedback. 
 
 Morrow ȋʹͲͳͶȌ used Colaizziǯs method to explore the lived experience of camping, with a 
particular interest in its impact on relationships. While there is a substantial literature on the 
use of structured camping-based interventions as a form of therapeutic intervention (e.g. Desai, 
Sutton, Staley & Hannon, 2013), there is very little about how people experience everyday 
unstructured recreational camping. Four participants were recruited on the basis that they had 
recently embarked on an unstructured camping trip. Through using Colaizziǯs method, five themes were identified: ǮGetting awayǯ, Ǯrelationship maintenanceǯ, Ǯtranquillity and relaxationǯ, Ǯappreciation of the natural environmentǯ and Ǯfreedom and adventure/explorationǯ. Following 
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the seven step process, an exhaustive description was created, which was then condensed into a 
fundamental structure of the lived experience of camping, which we reproduce below: ǮCamping provides the ideal escape for friends and couples alike. The tranquil and 
relaxing environment provides the ideal setting for relationship maintenance and 
reinforcement with friends and partners, whether there are issues to resolve or 
otherwise. The freedom experienced by individuals encouraged adventure and exploration, which in turn allowed them to appreciate the natural environment.ǯ. 
(Morrow, 2013:49).  
While the fundamental structure is the end-point of the analytic process, the  main themes from 
which it is derived are themselves useful to explore and present. Thus in Morrow, Rodriguez 
and King (2014) we focused particularly on the theme of ǲrelationship maintenanceǳ. 
 The final step in Colaizziǯs method, returning the results to the participants, is a controversial 
one, criticised by Giorgi (2006) who stated that the researcher and participant inevitably have 
different perspectives - the researcher from a phenomenological perspective and the participant from the Ǯnatural attitudeǯ ȋour everyday taken-for-granted perception of the world). This 
echoes a wider debate in qualitative research as to the value of ǲrespondent validationǳ or ǲmember checkingǳ. We would certainly agree that any notion that participants can simply 
rubber-stamp an analysis as ǲcorrectǳ is untenable. Nevertheless, given the aims of descriptive 
phenomenology, it is not unreasonable to expect that they should be able to recognise their own 
experience in the fundamental structure.  
 
Descriptive phenomenology is especially valuable in areas where there is little existing 
research, as was the case in the example we have given of the experience of recreational camping. For psychologists, Colaizziǯs method offers a clear and systematic approach; its thematic nature may be more familiar and accessible than the ǲdistillingǳ style offered by Giorgi. 
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Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) 
Jonathan A. Smith (Professor, Birkbeck University of London) 
 
Introduction  
IPA was developed and articulated as a particular approach to conducting experiential research 
in psychology (Smith 1996). Since then it has grown enormously and is now one of the best 
known and most frequently used approaches in qualitative psychology. IPA aims to provide an 
in-depth and nuanced analysis of participantsǯ accounts of their lived experience. For much of 
IPA, the experience in question is one of major significance or existential importance to the 
participant. Much of the early work was in health psychology but IPA is now used to address 
questions in a wide range of areas both within and beyond psychology. While IPA originates in 
the UK, it is increasingly being used in many countries.  
 
Philosophical background   
IPA represents an attempt to put some of the philosophical principles of phenomenology into 
practice in the form of a methodology which can be used for empirical research in psychology 
and related disciplines. It does not privilege any one phenomenological theoretical position but draws on the range of phenomenological thinking. )t tries,  as far as possible to go Ǯback to things themselvesǯ  ȋ(usserl, ʹͲͲͳ/ͳͻͲͲ-1901, p168), to capture personal lived experience in 
its own terms, as opposed to those prescribed by existing scientific or personal presumptions. 
However IPA recognises this process as an interpretative process and is therefore influenced by hermeneutics and (eideggerǯs hermeneutic phenomenology. 
. 
What is distinctive about the approach?   
IPA is meticulously idiographic, requiring the in-depth examination of each case in its own 
terms before moving to the next case. What comes out of this process is a detailed and nuanced 
analysis of convergence and divergence in participantsǯ accounts of experience. )PA is not in 
principle averse to moving to more general claims but such a move for IPA will be a slow, painstaking one. Following from )PAǯs micro-lens, is a particular concern with the value of the 
gem (Smith, 2011) the small extract which offers powerful illumination of the topic under investigation. )PA is described as involving a Ǯdouble hermeneuticǯ, as it recognises both researcher and participant as intrinsically sense making creatures. Therefore Ǯthe researcher is trying to make sense of the participants trying to make sense of their worldǯ ȋSmith & Osborn 
2003, p51). 
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Approach to data collection and analysis  
There is not a single right way of collecting data in IPA. Any method that allows a participant to 
give a detailed account of their personal lived experience can be used. Thus IPA has been 
conducted with diaries and other personal written accounts. However, by far the most common 
way of collecting data is through the in-depth, semi-structured interview. The popularity of the interview lies in allowing the researcher to hear the participantǯs unfolding account and decide, 
in real-time, where and when to probe further.  There is not a prescribed process of analysis. 
However, to help the newcomer to IPA, a guided step-by-step approach is offered- beginning 
with the close examination of the first case, leading to the extraction of micro-experiential 
themes and then a careful examination of patternings across the cases in the corpus. This 
primarily linear process is accompanied by a parallel operation of the hermeneutic circle, 
whereby pieces of text are seen as parts and wholes offering mutual illumination. Good IPA 
presents a stimulating and coherent analytic account evidenced with vivid quotes from 
participants and with some detailed interpretative commentary. For a detailed presentation of 
IPA, including coverage of the theoretical underpinnings as well as practical guidelines, see 
Smith, Flowers and Larkin (2009). 
 
Two examples  
In a recent paper (Smith & Rhodes, 2014) we present an in-depth analysis of the experience of 
first-episode depression. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 7 patients from a mental health service in London UK.  We interpreted the participantsǯ depression as involving a 
three-fold existential depletion in the relational, corporeal and temporal domains. Along with 
this diminution, participants experienced occasional intensified emotional reactions and 
frenzied thinking. The paper gives a detailed interpretative presentation of these features of depression illustrated with extracts from participantsǯ accounts. We point to the value of 
examining these existential features in the early stages of therapy.  
 
Another current paper (Kirkham, Smith & Havsteen-Franklin, in press) is concerned with understanding the experience of chronic pain. )t does this through an analysis of patientsǯ 
accounts of their own visual representations of their condition. Participants are seven women, 
aged between 36-52 years, from southern England. The pictures offer striking portrayals of the 
pain. In some the pain itself becomes a sinister punishing object; in others the picture is of the 
self in relation to pain. The art works also vividly capture the biographical context for the pain 
with representations of self before and after it had begun. Some images look ahead to a hoped 
for pain-free self in the future. We discuss the valuable role pictorial representation can play in 
helping the expression of difficult conditions and experiences. 
LearŶiŶg froŵ the ͚lifeworld͛. Puďlished iŶ The PsyĐhologist, August ϮϬϭ5. 
 
References : 
Husserl, E. (2001/1900-1901). Logical Investigations. Ed. Dermot Moran. 2nd ed. (vol 1) 
London: Routledge  
Kirkham, J., Smith, J.A., Havsteen-Franklin, D. (in press) Painting pain: An interpretative 
phenomenological analysis of representations of living with chronic pain. Health Psychology. 
 
Smith, J. A. (1996) Beyond the divide between cognition and discourse: using interpretative 
phenomenological analysis in health psychology. Psychology & Health, 11, 261-271. Smith, J.A. ȋʹͲͳͳȌ ǮWe could be diving for pearlsǯ: the value of the gem in experiential qualitative 
psychology. Qualitative Methods in Psychology Bulletin, 12, 6-15. 
 
Smith, J.A., Flowers, P. and Larkin, M. (2009) Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis: Theory, 
Method, Research. London: Sage. 
 
Smith, J. A. and Osborn, M. (2003) Interpretative phenomenological analysis, In:  J. A. Smith (Ed.) 
Qualitative Psychology. London:  Sage. 
Smith, J.A. and Rhodes, J. (2014) Being depleted and being shaken: an interpretative 
phenomenological analysis of the experiential features of a first episode of 
depression. Psycholology and Psychotherapy. DOI: 10.1111/papt.12034 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LearŶiŶg froŵ the ͚lifeworld͛. Puďlished iŶ The PsyĐhologist, August ϮϬϭ5. 
 
Critical Narrative Analysis (CNA) 
Darren Langdridge (Senior Lecturer, Open University) 
 
The method of Critical Narrative Analysis (CNA) that I have been developing was created to 
serve a specific purpose in my own research programme on sexualities and also resolve some of 
the epistemological tensions that I saw with other similar methods (Langdridge, 2007). It draws 
heavily but not uncritically on the hermeneutic phenomenological philosophy of Paul Ricoeur 
(1970, 1981) and is an attempt to work with language, power and politics within an overarching 
phenomenological framework. It is distinct from other forms of phenomenological analysis 
firstly through the explicit focus on narrative. Whilst this is not commonly seen amongst the 
better-known methods of phenomenological analysis featured here, it is common to a number 
of phenomenologically informed narrative methods (e.g. Polkinghorne, 1988). This theoretical 
focus on narrative reflects a Ricoeurian (1971, 1991) stance where meaning is appropriated 
through the critical interrogation of the stories we tell of our lives.  
 
The second distinctive element to this method is the inclusion of a moment of critique, in which 
hermeneutics of suspicion are deployed. To be more precise, this method engages with two 
analytic moments in a hermeneutic arc. The first moment is what Ricoeur would refer to as a Ǯhermeneutic of empathyǯ, and is that descriptive mode of understanding common to all 
phenomenological methods. The second moment involves the use of specific methods of 
interpretation - or in Ricoeurǯs terms Ǯhermeneutics of suspicionǯ - to critically interrogate the 
social imaginary, the world of stories into which we are all immersed and that allow and limit 
our ability to understand and narrate our experience. Ricoeur (1970) identifies Freud, Marx and Nietzsche as the Ǯthree masters of suspicionǯ but here ) depart somewhat from Ricoeur and 
argue that we need to turn to critical social theory for our critique rather than, if we take Freud 
as our example, by engaging in an archaeological trawl through the unconscious for hidden 
meaning. For me, the key to using hermeneutics of suspicion is to draw on social theory like 
queer theory or post-colonial theory as Ǯimaginative hermeneutics of suspicionǯ. This enables us 
to critique the ideology of the social worlds of researcher and participant alike for how it allows 
and limits understanding and narrative expression.  
 
Studies using this method are likely to be idiographic, with a focus on individual stories of 
particular life experiences. So, for instance, I conducted a piece of case study research with one 
of my therapy clients in which we worked together to examine his life as it related to being a 
sexual slave (Langdridge, 2009). But this need not be solely about the case study, as data from 
participants can be combined as seen, for instance, in the study of ethnicity and sexuality 
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conducted by David Mair (2010a,b). The data collection method is likely to involve a life story 
interview of some kind designed to encourage the telling of a story or stories related to the topic 
of interest. With the above-mentioned study, I asked my participant to tell me the story of his 
life as it related to his interest in being a sexual slave. Several hours later and with few 
interventions from me we stopped, with me having the privilege of considerable new insight into his Ǯlifeworldǯ through the stories he told me. ) suggest a number of analytic stages for CNA 
but these are open to modification: (1) a critique of the illusions of subjectivity; (2) identifying 
narratives, narrative tone and rhetorical function; (3) identities and identity work; (4) thematic 
priorities and relationships; (5) destabilising the narrative; (6) synthesis. These stages guide the 
researcher around a hermeneutic circle of analysis such that there is a critical but also ethical 
examination of the stories being told of the life, or lives, in question.  
 
Where the topic is notably inflected with power and politics, as we see with minority sexualities 
or ethnicities, and is also amenable to understanding through the stories told of personal 
experience, then CNA is likely to be appropriate. Should your research interests lie elsewhere 
then other methods from the phenomenological family may better suit your needs. CNA should be understood as Ǯopen sourceǯ, amenable to modification, to be used - or not - as you see fit. I do 
not want this contribution to be seen as simply promoting a new method but rather as an 
opportunity to think through your methodological needs across the range of phenomenological 
methods. We need to avoid rigid adherence to methodological guidelines and dogmatic fights. That is not to say Ǯanything goesǯ, not at all, but rather we should avoid the debates and politics 
so often associated with the marketing and branding of methodologies. Instead, we should focus 
our energy on achieving our shared research goals as phenomenologists, notably our desire to 
improve our understanding of the human condition.  
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Phenomenological Psychology: Experience in the lifeworld  
Peter Ashworth (Emeritus Professor, Sheffield Hallam University) 
Phenomenological psychology does not aim at discoveries of precisely the kind experimental 
psychology seeks. Experimental psychology uncovers the causal conditions of human behaviour, 
where the individual is seen as an intrinsic part of the objective system of mechanisms of the 
natural world. Phenomenological psychology, instead, aims to reveal the taken-for-granted 
meanings by which our experience is constituted. For example, when giving a gift (Ashworth, ʹͲͳ͵Ȍ what are the meanings involved for the giver and the recipient? What constitutes Ǯgiving a giftǯ? Such meanings are by no means always explicitly known but are usually lived through and 
these are to be brought to light. I will use the phenomenology of gifting below as an example.  
Principle of analysis (1) Keep in the realm of experience by the epochē 
Husserl (e.g. 1913/1983) insisted that to seriously scrutinize an experience purely as 
experience, an epochē is required, a setting aside of the presuppositions with which we 
approach it. William James (1890/1950) made a similar point specifically for psychology, 
pointing out how easily a researcher can unintentionally impose their own meanings onto research participantsǯ accounts or actions ȋfor Jamesǯs psychologistsǯ fallacy, see Ashworth, 
2009). Following Giorgi (2009), I regard it as imperative to adopt the discipline of the epochē, 
even though it can never be complete and in any case the researcher has to start trying to 
understand by using their own categories of thought. Be this as it may, the researcher must 
continually, self-critically question the accuracy of their understanding to minimize the danger of the psychologistǯs fallacy.  
For example, in investigating giving a gift, the scholarly literature (e.g. Mauss, 1925/1990, and 
Derrida, 1991/1992) almost unanimously argues that the recipient experiences an implicit 
obligation to reciprocate. (Gifting is thus reduced to the structure of economic exchange.) The 
presupposition that the obligation to reciprocate is part of the experience must, however, be 
subjected to the epochē. What is the experience itself like? Of course such things may re-appear 
in the findings (gifts might indeed evoke a sense of obligation). But these are not imposed prior 
to the description of the experience. 
The difficulty of the epochē has led some qualitative researchers to downplay its importance and 
to emphasize the role of interpretation. The danger of this move is that of succumbing to the psychologistǯs fallacy, and is only justifiable if the research plainly remains within the 
phenomenological realm – experience.  
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Principle of analysis (2) Notice both what is experienced and how it is experienced 
The realm of experience uncovered in the epochē has two thoroughly interdependent parts. In being conscious, oneǯs mode of approach to the experience ȋthe noesis) will entail some 
elements of memory, imagination, perception and so on, as well as various emotion-tones. At 
the same time what is experienced (the noema) is affected by, and affects, the noesis. Both 
aspects of intentionality (the approach of consciousness to its object) must be studied. The 
phenomenon entails both. 
Principle of analysis (3) Idiography alternates with essential structure   
An individualǯs Ǯnoematico-noeticǯ experience of a phenomenon is not free-floating or abstract, but is set in that personǯs specific lifeworld. A phenomenological research report will seek the essential Ǯconditions of possibilityǯ of such-and-such an experience – the features without which 
the experience would not be one of this kind. But in any particular personal instance, the experience will be thoroughly linked with other aspects of the individualǯs lifeworld. Research 
therefore alternates between the idiographic understanding of an individualǯs experience within 
the lifeworld, and the description of the essential features of a specific experience.  
Principle of analysis (4) Awareness of the lifeworld 
To help grasp the idiography of an experience some features of essential to any lifeworld should 
be noted (Ashworth, 2006 – developing especially Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962). Then those 
aspects which are bound up with the conditions of possibility of gifting can be sought.   
 Selfhood. How does the situation implicate identity, the personǯs sense of agency, their 
feeling of their own presence and voice in the situation, etc?  
 Sociality. How does the situation affect or depend on relations with others?  
When accounts of giving and receiving are used to describe the conditions of possibility of 
gifting in general, the lifeworldly elements self and other predominate. The giver assumes for 
themselves the right to give, and by the act of giving defines a relationship with the other. 
The recipient may or may not accept the gift. These dynamics may well be problematical. Gifting may then not Ǯfulfilledǯ.  
 Embodiment. How is our body implicated in the lifeworld? For instance, since our projects 
are to pursued through bodily action, illness, gender, age etc can have personal reality in 
the thwarting of our activities. Part of illness may be an inability to give. 
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 Temporality (and its events). How is the meaning of time, duration, or biography intrinsic 
to the situation? How is the past echoed now and the future anticipated in an act of giving?  
 Spatiality (and its things). Consider the meaning of the staging of giving and the form of the 
actual gift.  
 Project. How does this event of giving relate to activities to which the person is 
fundamentally committed?  
 Discourse. The gift relationship is surrounded by social conventions and linguistic 
formulae. However, important though it is, gifting discourse is by no means fully 
determinative or limpid. How the person speaks and enacts gifting must be carefully 
analysed.   
 Mood-as-atmosphere. A feeling-tone is an essential element of any situation, and in gifting 
the mood dynamics of the expression of gratitude are extraordinarily sensitive: gratitude 
seals the meaning of the gift as an affective affirmation. (Not, it is clear, as an economic 
exchange.)  
I have mentioned four principles of analysis. More detailed recommendations are beyond the scope of this article ȋgenerally, Giorgiǯs ʹͲͲͻ approach is to be recommendedȌ. The key 
perspective is this: The material of phenomenological psychology is precisely the intentional 
realm under the epochē, and the taken-for-granted meanings by which our experience is 
constituted. Research participantsǯ idiographic accounts are investigated, embedded in each 
personal lifeworld. Taking such idiographic evidence together, a description of the features 
without which the experience would not be of the kind under scrutiny is achieved. Such a 
description is phenomenological.   
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